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TAXATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY – PROBLEMS
OF DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING AND CONTINGENT
CLAIMS ANALYSIS IN REAL OPTION THEORY 
Abstract
This article deals with the integration of taxes into real option-based
investment models under risk neutrality and risk averison. It compares the
possible approaches dynamic programming and contingent claims analysis
to analyze their effects on the optimal investment rules before and after
taxes. It can be shown that despite their different assumptions, dynamic
programming and contingent claims analysis yield identical investment
thresholds under risk neutrality. In contrast, under risk aversion, there are
severe problems in determining an adequate risk-adjusted discount rate. The
application of contingent claims analysis is restricted to cases with a dividend
rate unaffected by risk. Therefore, only dynamic programming permits an
explicit investment threshold without taxation. After taxes, both approaches
fail to reach general solutions. Nevertheless, using a sufficient condition, it is
possible to derive neutral tax systems under risk aversion as is demonstrated
by using dynamic programming.














In recent years, literature on capital budgeting has been largely enriched by numerous
publications on real options [e.g. Myers (1977), Brennan and Schwartz (1985), McDonald
and Siegel (1986), Majd and Pindyck (1987), Dixit (1989), Pindyck (1991), Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis (1996), Grenadier and Weiss (1997), Moretto (2000), Lensink
and Sterken (2001)]. Real option theory - the application of option pricing theory on
non-ﬁnancial investment - takes account of uncertainty and irreversibility of investment
decisions. Recently, public economists have extended real option theory by integrating
taxation [e.g. Harchaoui and Lasserre (1996), Alvarez and Kanniainen (1997), Niemann
(1999)].
A real option-based investment model requires the decision between two approaches: ei-
ther dynamic programming (DP), similar to decision-tree analysis, or contingent claims
analysis (CCA), an approach derived from the pricing of ﬁnancial options. While both
methods yield equivalent results in the tax-free case [cf. for a mathematically rigorous
analysis of the relationship of DP and CCA in tax-free models Knudsen, Meister and Zer-
vos (1999)], integrating taxes reveals some interesting diﬀerences, especially under risk
aversion. This raises the question if there is a superior approach and if there are limits to
the integration of taxes in capital budgeting.
Our article deals with this agenda beginning with a simplifying assumption widely used
in public economics, but often rejected in ﬁnancial economics: risk neutrality. Our aim
is to demonstrate the basic principles of the DP- and the CCA-approach in real option
theory. In chapter 2, we present the general assumptions underlying both approaches and
demonstrate in chapter 3 that there are similarities in the pre-tax and post-tax case. In
chapter 4, the risk neutrality assumption is relaxed and the DP- and the CCA-method
are discussed in the more general setting of risk aversion, including a proof of neutral tax
systems. In chapter 5, the properties of both approaches are compared before and after
taxes, under risk neutrality and under risk aversion. Chapter 6 summarizes with some
concluding remarks.
Traditional models of investment under uncertainty neglect an aspect crucial to invest-
ment decisions in reality: ﬂexibility when decisions are irreversible. Under conditions of
irreversibility, abandoning a project already in place becomes impossible or at least expen-
sive. A supposedly beneﬁcial project can prove disadvantageous when market conditions
1turn suﬃciently unfavorable. Therefore, the possibility to defer a decision and wait for
more information can help to avoid harmful decisions. Thus, ﬂexibility constitutes an
economic value of its own. Deriving a rule for optimal investment under uncertainty
and irreversibility requires the valuation of managerial ﬂexibility. Since the 1970s, an
important branch of ﬁnancial economics deals with this matter: option pricing theory.
Therefore, ﬂexibilities in the context of non-ﬁnancial (real) investment are called real
options.
Although real option literature characterizes many other types [for an overview, cf. Tri-
georgis (1996)], real options - like their ﬁnancial counterparts - can be roughly divided
into calls and puts. A “real” call is an option to invest. It provides the opportunity to
acquire a project with stochastic cash ﬂow and thus uncertain present value. A “real” put
is an option to abandon a project already in place. Further real options can be modeled
as multi-stage combinations of calls and puts.
The main ﬁelds of application are commodity-related investment projects like oil explo-
ration, mining and forestry [cf. Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Morck, Schwartz and
Stangeland, (1989)]. Real option-based models are also being applied to real estate devel-
opment and strategic acquisitions [cf. Quigg (1995), Smith and Triantis (1995)]. Mathe-
matically, these investment decisions are characterized by an optimal stopping problem.
Since real options seem to be widely accepted for assessing investment projects in ﬁnan-
cial theory as well as in business practice, it suggests itself to integrate taxation into real
option-based models. By doing so, it is possible to derive an investment rule considering
taxational eﬀects and to identify tax systems that are neutral with respect to invest-
ment decisions. For risk neutral investors, such tax systems have already been proved [cf.
Niemann (1999)].
As under the classical net present value rule, the investment rule in real option-based
models is simply that a project’s beneﬁts must outweigh its costs. Here, the beneﬁts
are deﬁned by the expected present value of the investment project plus the additional
real options generated by realizing the project. The costs, in contrast, consist of the
strike price, i.e., the project’s initial outlay and the value of the real options exercised by
carrying out the investment. All components of the costs and beneﬁts can be functions
of one or more stochastic variables. The decision rule gives the realization of stochastic
variables that is necessary and suﬃcient to stop waiting and abandon ﬂexibility.
22 General assumptions
The following section provides a summary of the assumptions that are common for all
models discussed in this paper. We will consider diﬀerent models including an option
to invest. Its owner permanently faces the decision on either exercising the option, i.e.,
stopping, carrying out the project and collecting the resulting cash ﬂow or continuing
waiting and sacriﬁcing cash ﬂows but keeping the option to avoid unexpectedly low cash
ﬂows. It is assumed that the initial outlay I0 is deterministic and constant and that all




= αdt + σ dz (1)
with constant drift α and constant volatility σ, where dz denotes the increment of a
standard Wiener process.
Exercising the option to invest is assumed totally irreversible, i.e., it is impossible to
abandon a project during its economic life ending at time T. T may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite.
For reasons of simplicity, we will mostly assume an inﬁnitely-lived project and a perpetual
option to invest. The project does not include any additional ﬂexibility, so its only beneﬁt
is the expected cash ﬂow. Generally, the project’s cash ﬂow π is a function of the stochastic
variable P and time t: π ≡ π(P,t).
Integrating taxation, some simplifying assumptions concerning the tax base and the tax
rate are necessary. The tax base equals cash ﬂow π less depreciation allowances d that may
be deterministic or stochastic1. The tax rate τ is assumed deterministic and constant, so
under an immediate loss-oﬀset, the post-tax cash ﬂow πτ is deﬁned as:
πτ = π − τ (π − d) = (1 − τ) π + τ d. (2)
As long as the option to invest is not exercised, available funds yield the risk-free capital
market rate r that is assumed constant. The debit and credit rates are identical. A fraction
γ of credit or debit interest payment is liable to tax or tax-deductible, respectively. The
risk-free after-tax interest rate rτ can be written as rτ = (1 − γ τ) r.
1Depreciation allowances might also include immediate write-oﬀs.
33 Real options under risk neutrality
3.1 Tax-free case
One method to derive the optimal investment rule under uncertainty and to assess the
value of the option to invest is a technique widely used in economics: dynamic program-
ming [cf. Bellman (1957)]. An alternative method has emerged from option pricing theory:
contingent claims analysis. Since the optimality principles are well known in real option
theory, we will only give a brief introduction in order to focus on post-tax problems.
It is known from real option literature that assuming an output price P following a
geometric Brownian motion and the investment decision being completely irreversible,
yields the general objective function
max
u {max{V (P) − I0,F (P)}} (3)












F(P): value of the option to invest
u: action variable
V (P): expected present value of the investment project,
which is independent of applying either the DP or the CCA approach.
To derive a rule for optimal investment, at ﬁrst we have to assess the value of the un-
derlying asset, the investment project. If the project is in place, it does not involve any
ﬂexibility, so its economic value consists solely of its future cash ﬂows. For reasons of sim-
plicity, the cash ﬂow π(P,t) is set equal to the geometric Brownian motion P: π(P,t) = P.
Assuming risk neutrality, the project value V is determined by its expected present value
computed with the risk-free rate r:









; r > α. (5)
3.1.1 Dynamic programming
Given the value of the underlying asset (eq. 5), the value of the option to invest can
be determined. Since the owner of the option can only decide between waiting and
exercising, the decision variable is binary, so it is possible to check optimality by complete
enumeration. We will start with the continuation region in which the option is kept alive.
The optimal transition to the stopping or exercise region will be modeled by boundary
conditions.
4The option does not carry any cash ﬂows, so its possible payoﬀ only consists of its ex-
pected appreciation in value. The continuous-time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for
determining the value of the call can be written as:
rF
! = E[dF]. (6)
Its economic interpretation is that the owner of the option expects an instantaneous return
that in equilibrium equals the risk-free rate. Application of Itˆ o’s lemma to the stochastic









∂P 2 + αP
∂F
∂P
− rF = 0. (7)
Assuming a perpetual real option, the time derivative ∂F
∂t vanishes and eq. (7) reduces to






dP 2 + αP
dF
dP
− rF = 0 (8)
with the general solution
F (P) = AP














σ2 > 1, (9)
where A is a constant to be determined. The boundary conditions are:
F (0) = 0 (10)
F (P
∗) = V (P







Eq. (10) implies that a call on a worthless underlying is itself worthless. Eqs. (11)
and (12) are free boundary conditions determining the transition from the continuation
region to the stopping region at the critical investment threshold P ∗. Eq. (11) means
that a project’s beneﬁts must equal its costs at the point of transition. It is called value-
matching condition. Eq. (12) is a so-called smooth-pasting or high contact condition
requiring the identity of marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs at the critical threshold.





(r − α)I0. (13)
The critical value P ∗ indicates whether investment should be delayed or not. If the
actually observed realization P is higher than the critical value P ∗, the investment should
be carried out immediately, otherwise it must be postponed until P ∗ is reached.
53.1.2 Contingent claims analysis
In analogy to the Black-Scholes formula [cf. Black and Scholes (1973)] in CCA, a risk-free
portfolio has to be formed to assess the value of the option to invest and herewith to
determine the decision rule. The portfolio Φ consists of one option to invest and n units
in a short position of the investment project or a perfectly replicating asset:
Φ = F (P) − nP. (14)
For n = ∂F
∂P all stochastic terms vanish, so the portfolio is riskless. In the absence of
arbitrage opportunities, the riskless total return from the portfolio equals the return from
the real option plus the negative return from the short position during a time interval of
length dt. Substituting for n yields







with δ = r − α, the dividend rate. After some transformations, the ordinary diﬀerential
equation (8) from dynamic programming can be derived. Considering identical boundary
conditions a critical threshold, which is equivalent to the one from dynamic programming
(eq. 13) can be determined.
A critical assumption of CCA is the replication or spanning property. In reality, there are
only very few perfectly replicating assets for real investment, especially in commodity-
related projects like oil exploration or mining. In any case, the existence of futures markets
often enables to construct a replicating portfolio.
An advantage of CCA is the endogenization of the capital market rate whereas DP is
limited to cases in which the discount rate is given exogeneously. In this chapter, the
analysis is restricted to a risk neutral scenario, so the problem of ﬁnding an adequate
discount rate is irrelevant. Both approaches refer to the exogeneously determined risk-
free rate. The derivation of an appropriate discount rate will gain importance in a context
of risk aversion in chapter 4.
3.2 Integrating taxes
The literature on real options hardly considers taxation [Exceptions are Majd and Myers
(1987), Mauer and Ott (1995), Harchaoui and Lasserre (1996), Pennings (2000), Agliardi
(2001), e.g.]. Neither investment nor taxes are treated in a general mode. Therefore,
these approaches are not applicable to draw general conclusions concerning the inﬂuence
of taxation on investment behavior.
63.2.1 Dynamic programming
The integration of taxes requires the same steps as in the tax-free case. At ﬁrst, the value
of the underlying asset has to be determined. The project value after taxes Vτ is the
expected present value of the future after-tax cash ﬂows πτ
V:



























+ τ E[D]; rτ > α, (17)
with D as the present value of immediate write-oﬀs and current depreciation deductions.
Whereas the option to invest might principally be regarded as depreciable2, we focus on a
non-depreciable option to invest. Thus, the option’s cash ﬂow generally consisting of the
tax shield on depreciation deductions vanishes in the case considered here. Computing
the post-tax option value Fτ requires the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
rτ Fτ
! = E[dFτ], (18)






dP 2 + αP
dFτ
dP
− rτ Fτ = 0 (19)
with the general solution
Fτ (P) = Aτ P














σ2 > 1, (20)
with Aτ, a constant to be determined. The boundary conditions for the generalized case
of stochastic depreciations are similar to the tax-free case:
Fτ (0) = 0 (21)
Fτ (P
∗
τ ) = Vτ(P
∗









Generally, it is not possible to compute the critical investment threshold in the model with
taxes P ∗
τ analytically unless the stochastic nature of depreciation allowances is known, e.g.,








(I0 − τ D), (24)
2Acquired real options are depreciable under most tax regimes.
7The optimal investment rules before and after taxes at hand, it is possible to derive neutral
tax systems by equating the critical investment thresholds and solving for the present value
of depreciation allowances. Since neutral tax systems are well-known under certainty
[cf. Brown (1948), Preinreich (1951), Samuelson (1964), Johansson (1969), Brennan and
McGuire (1975), Boadway and Bruce (1984)] and neutral taxes have already been derived
under risk neutrality in real option literature [e.g. Niemann (1999)], we will not discuss
their properties in detail and will leave further derivations aside. It should only be noted
that the cash ﬂow tax and the Johansson-Samuelson tax are special cases of such neutral
tax systems.
3.2.2 Contingent claims analysis
Referring to the tax system from chapter 2, the riskless portfolio with taxes becomes:




For tax purposes, it has to be clariﬁed, whether the portfolio consists of depreciable assets
or ﬁnancial and therefore non-depreciable assets. Excluding acquired options, the real
option is assumed non-depreciable and therefore has to be interpreted as a ﬁnancial asset.
The short position has to be regarded as a liability. Since the investor is selling short
and therefore not owning the output from investment, he is not supposed to depreciate
the short position. The writer of the short position receives a taxable payment of ∂Fτ
∂P δP.
From the investor’s viewpoint, the portfolio is a ﬁnancial asset.
For simpliﬁcation, we will assume that the portfolio’s pre-tax value in a world with tax-
ation is identical to the one in the tax-free model. The equilibrium condition is
rτ Φτ dt = Nτ dt, (26)
where Nτ represents the portfolio’s after-tax return and Φτ the after-tax value of the
portfolio. The right hand side of this equilibrium condition describes the after-tax cash
ﬂow the investor receives during a time interval of length dt when liquidating the portfolio.
Because the portfolio is non-depreciable, this cash ﬂow amounts to:





















8In order to reach an investment decision and to prove tax neutrality, the critical value P ∗
τ















and further the ordinary diﬀerential equation known from eq. (19). In contrast to dynamic
programming (eq. 17), the investment project’s post-tax present value V τ(P) in CCA does
not include the tax shield on depreciation allowances for notational reasons. Whether the
tax shield on depreciation allowances is included in the eﬀective initial outlay Iτ
0 or in
the project value does not aﬀect the boundary conditions. The eﬀective after-tax initial
outlay under deterministic depreciation deductions can be denoted as
I
τ
0 = I0 − τD. (29)
As in DP, D in eq. (29) reﬂects the present value of depreciation allowances for the
project’s entire economic life. Applying the boundary conditions in the post-tax case:
Fτ (0) = 0 (30)
Fτ (P
∗
τ ) = V τ (P
∗



















(I0 − τD). (33)
Comparing it with the pre-tax model’s critical value P ∗ (eq. 13), it is obvious that
taxation might cause a distorting eﬀect by asymmetrical treatment of ﬁnancial and real
investment.
4 Real options under risk aversion
As demonstrated above, optimizing the investor’s objective function leads to equivalent
results for both methods under risk neutrality. Expanding the analysis with respect to
risk aversion, this result cannot be acknowledged as will be seen.
4.1 Tax-free case
4.1.1 Dynamic programming
Using the DP approach the derivation of the investment rule requires either an exoge-
neously determined risk-adjusted discount rate (RADR) or explicit knowledge of an in-
9vestor’s risk preferences. In the preceeding sections, for reasons of simplicity, we assumed
risk neutrality to restrict the computations on expected present values.
In reality, investors are typically risk averse, which is reﬂected by traditional capital
market models where risky assets yield higher expected returns than risk-free assets.
There are diﬀerent ways to deal with risk aversion in models of capital budgeting, e.g.
RADRs or martingales. We will not use RADRs in the DP approach because even in
the tax-free case, the CAPM’s meaningfulness is quite limited with additional diﬃculties
in the integration of taxes [e.g. Bogue and Roll (1974), Fama (1977), Constantinides
(1980)]. A quite sophisticated method to model risk aversion are martingale measures [cf.
e.g. Harrison and Kreps (1979), Harrison and Pliska (1981)]. Since it is not yet clear if
martingales do exist after the integration of taxes, we will leave it as a subject for further
research. Instead, investors’ risk preferences are endogenized by their utility functions.
Strictly speaking, maximizing an individual’s utility under risk aversion requires a global
model of all decision variables since the utility function’s non-linearity does not permit
separation of partial decision models like consumption, saving and investment. Therefore,
some simplifying assumptions have to be made in order to concentrate on the investment
behavior. The optimal division of a cash ﬂow into saving and consumption will be left aside
because it requires information from outside the investment model. For this reason, cash
ﬂows instead of consumption expenditures will be used as the utility function’s argument.
This assumption can be justiﬁed by deﬁning the utility from a cash ﬂow being the result
of optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption.
Apart from this more restrictive assumption, the utility function U ≡ U(π) should be well-
behaved, i.e., time-invariant (∂U
∂t = 0), twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with positive and
diminishing marginal utility (∂U
∂π > 0, ∂2U
∂π2 < 0). Utility is assumed additive over time.
Intertemporal utility transformation can be realized only by intertemporal transformation
of cash ﬂows. The risk-free interest rate r is assumed constant. Without restricting
generality, utility is standardized to U(0) = 0, U(1) = 1. Disutility from an investment
project’s initial outlay U(−I0) is treated as an individual constant.
Qualitatively speaking, the situation under risk aversion is the same as under risk neu-
trality. The investor holds a perpetual option to invest in an inﬁnitely-lived project with
deterministic initial outlay I0 =const. and stochastic cash ﬂow π ≡ π (P,t). Again, the
decision variable is binary: the investor can either continue waiting or exercise the op-
10tion to invest. Nevertheless, the decision rule has to be adopted to risk aversion. Now,
exercising the option is optimal when the investment project’s discounted future utility
exceeds the initial outlay’s utility plus the option’s utility. In principle, this rule is valid
under risk neutrality, too, because utility is equivalent to expected monetary units in that
context. In contrast, under risk aversion, the num´ eraire is utility rather than money.
Again, the investment project and the option to invest will be valued separately. Accord-
ing to the preceeding sections, the project’s cash ﬂow π equals the stochastic variable P
which is still the only source of uncertainty and which follows a geometric Brownian mo-
tion. A project already in place does not oﬀer any ﬂexibility, so its value simply consists
of its expected discounted utility:







In the limiting case P → 0, the realized project has zero value because of the standard-
ization U(0) = 0: V (0) = 0. It should be emphasized that all assets are valued in utility
units. For comparison, monetary units have to be transformed by applying the utility
function.
As under risk neutrality, it is necessary to evaluate the option to invest under both settings
of the control variable. At the stopping region, the option value equals its intrinsic value
Ω which is the maximum of subjective project value plus the disutility resulting from the
initial outlay and zero:
Ω ≡ Ω(P) = max{V (P) + U(−I0);0}. (35)
In the continuation region, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation can be written as:
rF




where πF denotes the possible cash ﬂow from holding the option. The economic interpre-
tation is that the risk-free return (measured in utility units) must equal the instantaneous
utility plus the expected change in utility during the next inﬁnitesimal time interval.
Since the option comprises no pre-tax cash ﬂow (πF = 0), its instantaneous utility is







dP 2 + αP
dF
dP
− rF = 0, (37)




The reason is that the diﬀerential equation determining the option value only depends on
the underlying stochastic process which by assumption is the same as under risk neutrality.
The option value itself is diﬀerent, of course. The investor’s utility function determines
the underlying asset and therefore the option coeﬃcient A.
Again, solving the investment problem requires two free boundary conditions. At the
optimal point of transition, P ∗, the expected utility of the continuation alternative must
equal the expected utility of the stopping alternative (value matching):
F(P
∗)













Without explicit knowledge of the utility function U(P) these expressions cannot be
further elaborated.
Nevertheless, the procedure can be characterized in general. Because P is a geomet-
ric Brownian motion, a continuous function U(P) follows a diﬀusion process with drift
function αU and volatility function σU.3 Applying Itˆ o’s lemma on the stochastic utility



































dt + σ P
dU
dP | {z }
σU(U)
dz. (41)
P can be eliminated by the inverse function U−1(U(P)) = P, so that the stochastic
diﬀerential equation (41) only contains functions of U. Accordingly, utility and expected
3These functions may be more complex than a geometric Brownian motion, so that it is not always
possible to compute expected utility.
12utility at time t can be written as stochastic and deterministic integrals:















− αU(U(t)) = 0. (43)
Its solution constitutes expected utility at time t. Since αU(U) may be nonlinear in U,
there is no guarantee for analytical solutions. But even if these do exist, simple examples





−r (ξ−t) dξ (44)
cannot always be computed. For economically useful results, suﬃciently well-behaved
utility functions are required. One such example is the power utility U(P) = P R (0 <
R < 1). Unfortunately, even widely-used utility functions like logarithmic or exponential
utility do not permit analytical solutions because solving the diﬀerential equation (37)
requires standardizing utility U(0) = 0 to avoid inﬁnite nonhomogenous parts of the
equation.
4.1.2 Contingent claims analysis
In contrast to DP, CCA requires an endogeneous discount rate. This might be useful if
we do not succeed in solving problems concerning individual risk preference functions.
Well-known from Black-Scholes analysis, option pricing theory, being the basis for CCA,
seems to allow a risk neutral scenario for risk averse investors and herewith apparently
oﬀers the possibility to ignore individual risk preferences.
The objective function under risk neutrality (3) has to be adopted to risk aversion intro-
ducing a RADR µ:
max
u {max{V (P) − I0,F (P)}} (45)











In option pricing theory forming a portfolio allows risk neutral valuation of ﬁnancial
options even for risk averse investors. For optimization purposes one may refer to the
exogeneous risk-free market rate of return r. Nevertheless, we have to ﬁnd out, whether
13the problem of a suitable risk-adjusted discount factor can really be avoided in the context
of real investment. The equilibrium condition (15) under risk aversion becomes:






δ P dt. (46)
In CCA, the RADR inﬂuences the optimization calculus by the dividend rate δ although
a risk-free portfolio and herewith a risk neutral scenario is supposedly constructed. The
investor has to pay ∂F
∂Pδ P dt, where δ = µ − α, during an interval of length dt to the
writer of the short position.
In the Black-Scholes-formula expanded for dividend payments [cf. Merton (1973b), p.
171)], δ = µ−α appears, too. In contrast to the real options approach, risk aversion does
not inﬂuence the option value in the option pricing model since δ can be interpreted as an
exogeneously given dividend rate. The amount of the dividend payment is either known
or it can be estimated on the basis of former dividend payments. This seems permissable
since dividend payments in general remain constant over time [cf. Lintner (1956), Cragg
(1986), pp. 195-196] and ﬁnancial options are normally short term investments, which
implies that they are unlikely to suﬀer unexpected changes of the dividend. Therefore, δ
may be considered exogeneous.
In contrast to ﬁnancial option pricing, the dividend rate δ in CCA is endogeneous. This is
a result from the relation µ = α+δ, where µ comprises a risk premium η σ and therefore,
µ = r + η σ, with η, the risk aversion coeﬃcient [cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pp.
149-150, Trigeorgis (1996), p. 97].
In order to determine the appropriate RADR, the distribution of the the risk premium η σ
among the growth rate α and the dividend rate δ has to be explained by a sophisticated
capital market model. Even abstracting from the CAPM inherent problems (e.g. appli-
cation of a one-period model to a multi-period decision problem etc.) [cf. e.g. Merton
(1973a), p. 885, Bogue and Roll (1974), pp. 604-606, Roll (1977), Kazemi (1991), p. 224,
Kulatilaka and Marcus (1992), p. 94, Sick (1995), pp. 634-636 and 639-643], the real
option approach fails to solve this problem.
Dixit and Pindyck assume δ to be independent of σ and only α to include the risk premium
[cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pp. 149-150]. Accepting this assumption, analyzing tax
systems and applying CCA, there is no need to know µ and the risk premium ησ. Every α
comprising term included in the equilibrium condition vanishes after application of Itˆ o’s
14lemma. Consequently, the risk premium has no impact on the critical value P ∗. For this
scenario, the results under risk neutrality can be transferred unamended to the case of






Whenever the risk premium is supposed to be included in α as well as in δ, a sophisticated
capital market equilibrium model is needed, which, among other aspects, allows to deduce
a rule for dividing up the risk premium between the two components. Consequently, λ
and herewith the critical threshold P ∗ will be inﬂuenced by risk aversion. It is not possible
to generate pseudo risk neutrality by forming a hedge portfolio any more.
4.2 Integrating taxes
Under risk neutrality, our focus was the presentation of the DP and the CCA approach
as a basis for their comparison in chapter 5. We referred to investment rules and neutral
tax systems only incidentically because these aspects are already known in real options
literature. In contrast, under risk aversion, no neutral tax systems have been proved until
now, so it should be discussed whether an optimal investment rule after taxes exists and
derive it to prove neutral tax systems.
4.2.1 Dynamic programming
Using DP, we will refer to the exogeneously determined risk-free rate r. Therefore, the
risk-free post-tax discount rate rτ is the same as under risk neutrality: rτ = (1 − γτ)r.
The value of the realized project is the intertemporal utility from its after-tax cash ﬂows:









E[U((1 − τ)P + τ d)] e
−rτ(ξ−t)dξ. (48)
Since the investor’s utility function is non-linear, it is not possible to separate the cash
ﬂow and depreciation components in discounted utility terms. For this reason, the post-
tax critical investment threshold can be computed only in special cases. Even without
taking the option to invest into account, it becomes obvious that the derivation of neutral
tax systems involves a circular argument: the depreciation function d is already needed to
derive the critical investment threshold which in turn is necessary to compute the neutral
depreciation schedule. A special case in which the critical threshold can be explicitly
computed is the cash ﬂow tax. It is well known that under risk aversion, the cash ﬂow tax
15is not neutral. This result can be proved in a real options model, too. Compared with
the tax-free case, the cash ﬂow tax will typically promote investment because it reduces
the initial outlay I0 as well as current cash ﬂows by the same factor τ, while the marginal
utility obtained by the tax shield on the initial outlay exceeds the marginal utility from
the foregone cash ﬂow.
Nevertheless, neutral tax systems can be proved in a generalized model with the following
additional assumptions:
• The project’s economic life may be ﬁnite: T ≤ ∞.
• Cash ﬂows are a function of the geometric Brownian motion P and time t: π ≡
π(P,t).
• Cash ﬂows equal zero after time T: π(P,T) = 0.
• A fraction Di of the initial outlay I0 might be written oﬀ immediately. To separate
immediate write-oﬀs from current depreciation deductions, the former are included
in the eﬀective initial outlay I
eff
0 that is reduced by the tax shield on the immediate
write-oﬀ: I
eff
0 = (1 − τ Di) I0.
• The option to invest is assumed depreciable. Depreciation deductions associated
with the option to invest are denoted by dF ∈IR. Accordingly, it might involve a
non-zero cash ﬂow πF = τ dF.4
• Depreciation allowances may be stochastic as well as deterministic: dV ≡ dV(P,t),
dF ≡ dF(P,t).
In this case, the project’s pre-tax value V is given by:











with V (0,t) = V (P,T) = 0. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the option value
in the continuation region is once again:
rF




4Variables concerning the option are denoted with subscript F, variables concerning the investment
project with subscript V .
16It can be used in the present context of a non-perpetual option as well, but following
from the time-dependence the partial derivative ∂F
∂t does not vanish, so the option value









∂P 2 + αP
∂F
∂P
− rF = 0, (51)
with F(0,t) = F(P,T) = 0. Although the partial diﬀerential equation is equivalent to the
risk neutral case, it has to be mentioned that the option value as well as the project value
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Since this problem involves a free boundary problem with a partial diﬀerential equation,
it typically cannot be solved analytically. For this reason, it is not possible to derive a
rule for optimal investment. As a consequence, neutral tax systems cannot be derived by
simply equating the pre-tax and the post-tax investment thresholds, i.e., it is not possible
to refer to the neutrality condition that is necessary as well as suﬃcient.
Nevertheless, we can fall back on a condition that is only suﬃcient. In the model presented
here, it is admissable to use the pre-tax model as a yardstick for measuring tax eﬀects,
because maximization of individual utility in a tax-free scenario leads to the desired Pareto
optimum. As a ﬁrst step towards neutral tax systems, the post-tax investment problem
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−rτ(ξ−t) dξ (54)






Vτ(P,T) = 0. (56)
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− rτ Fτ + U(π
τ
F) = 0 (57)
5Notice that πF = 0 and U(0) = 0.






Fτ(P,T) = 0 (59)

















Although these investment problems are not analytically tractable, it is possible to de-
rive neutral tax systems by comparing the pre-tax and post-tax problems rather than
their solutions. Of course, this neutrality condition is only suﬃcient but not necessary.
The technique is used under risk neutrality in Niemann (1999). Identical solutions may
be achieved by diﬀerent problems whereas identical problems necessarily yield identical
solutions. The investment problems under consideration are identical if the pre-tax and
post-tax partial diﬀerential equations and boundary conditions are equivalent.
We will look at the free boundary conditions ﬁrst. The value matching and smooth pasting
conditions before and after taxes are equivalent if all values - measured in utility units -





0 ) = cU(−I0)
0 < c = const. (62)
Then:
F(P
∗t) = V (P
∗,t) + U(−I0)
⇔ cF(P




















We will now analyze in detail which conditions cause a linear transformation in utility.
Proportionality of disutility from the initial outlay before taxes U(−I0) and after taxes
18U(−I
eff
0 ) can be achieved by granting a utility-dependent immediate write-oﬀ. If the
constant of proportionality c is given by tax law, the immediate write-oﬀ Di can be
computed using the relationship I
eff



















As far as the proportionality of pre-tax and after-tax project values is concerned, the
non-separability of cash ﬂow- and depreciation-related utility components does not allow
the computation of neutral depreciation deductions in present value terms. Thus, it is
necessary to derive a neutral depreciation schedule. Instead of directly equating Vτ(P,t)
and cV (P,t), we will use a condition that is suﬃcient for proportionality of pre-tax and
after-tax project values, i.e., proportionality of their time derivatives given the terminal







rτ Vτ − U(π
τ
V) = c [rV − U(πV)]
U [(1 − τ)πV + τ dV] = cU(πV) − γ τ rcV
(1 − τ)πV + τ dV = U
−1 [cU(πV) − γ τ rcV ]
dV =






This depreciation schedule for the investment project implies proportionality of pre-tax
and post-tax project values. Additionally, option values before and after taxes are pro-
portional if the partial diﬀerential equations that determine their values are equivalent.









∂P 2 + αP
∂F
∂P
− rF = 0, (67)









∂P 2 + αP
∂Fτ
∂P
− rFτ = 0. (68)
A depreciation schedule for the option to invest that implies the equivalence of eqns (57)
and (68) causes proportionality of the option values before and after taxes if the boundary
19conditions required for uniqueness are also equivalent. The partial diﬀerential equations
match if:
−rFτ = −rτ Fτ + U(π
τ
F)
(rτ − r)Fτ = U(π
τ
F)









−1 (−γ τ rcF). (69)
Here, it becomes obvious that depreciation allowances on the option to invest are necessary
to ensure the suﬃcient neutrality condition can be met - at least when the interest rate
is subject to tax. The neutral depreciation schedules for the investment project and the
option to invest are preference-dependent. Typically, it is not possible to eliminate the
utility function U and its inverse U−1 from dV, dF and Di. Since diﬀerent investors are
characterized by diﬀerent utility functions, neutral taxation cannot refer to an objective
tax base. To guarantee certainty of the law, recommendations for tax reforms should not
be deduced from these results. Nevertheless, the results may indicate the possible impact
of a tax reform on taxpayers’ behavior.
4.2.2 Contingent claims analysis
Integrating taxes into CCA principally permits using the model from risk neutrality as
long as the RADR’s risk premium is included solely in α. The results from risk neutral-
ity can be transferred to risk aversion. In this speciﬁc scenario, the critical investment







(I0 − τD). (70)
Results concerning tax neutrality derived under risk neutrality hold under these assump-
tions, too. Otherwise, taxes have to be taken into account when deriving the RADR,
e.g. by employing a post-tax CAPM. If interest payments are subject to tax, the pre-
tax RADR is not simply supposed to be reduced by the tax rate to receive the after-tax
RADR. Therefore, the integration of taxes in CCA under risk aversion requires an ap-
propriate capital market equilibrium model which includes taxation, options and their
interdependences in a dynamic context.
The CAPM-RADR in a real option approach depends on the stochastic process P and
herewith on the present value of the investment object as well as the risk associated with
the option to invest. Thus, endogenizing the risk premium, the RADR itself becomes
20stochastic. The interdependence of the stochastic underlying asset, CAPM-RADR, op-
tion value and herewith the dynamic investment rule, call for a sophisticated capital
market equilibrium model, which takes account of all these complex dynamic interac-
tions. With respect to taxation, dividend policy might play an important role. Taxation
that discriminates between retained earnings and dividend payments inﬂuences δ, too.
On the one hand, the dividend rate depends directly on the underlying tax system, on
the other hand it is inﬂuenced indirectly by taxation via the post-tax RADR.
An extended CAPM suitable for CCA under risk aversion in general has to take these as-
pects into account. Whereas the standard-CAPM has been extended for taxation [cf. e.g.
Brennan (1970), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), pp. 165-173], a modiﬁed multi-
period-CAPM that is necessary for long-term real investment still has to be developed.
As could be shown in the pre-tax model, generating a hedge portfolio does not create a
scenario that complies with “pure” risk neutrality in general. Not only the problem of
an appropriate post-tax RADR is unsolved, but missing a consistent pre-tax model as a
reference system, there is no yardstick for investigations concerning taxational eﬀects on
investment behavior. In analogy with section 4.2.1, expanding the analysis on investment
projects with a ﬁnite economic life and on stochastic and time-dependent depreciation
allowances requires the solution of a free-boundary problem with a partial diﬀerential
equation making analytical solutions unlikely for this scenario.
5 Comparison of the approaches
The main motivational factors for employing real option approaches instead of traditional
models of capital budgeting under uncertainty are the introduction of managerial ﬂexibil-
ity in light of irreversibility and the possibility to abstract from individual risk preferences.
Both approaches succeed in integrating ﬂexibility under irreversibility. With respect to
the abstraction from individual risk preference functions unter risk aversion, each method
reveals its speciﬁc limitations. As could be shown, implementing taxation does not evoke
any diﬃculties under risk neutrality. Both approaches yield identical critical thresholds
and herewith equivalent investment rules under the given set of assumptions.
Since DP employs an exogeneously given discount rate, this method necessarily neglects
information from market data in case of risk aversion. Therefore, it is not possible to
distinguish between unsystematic and systematic risk. In contrast to risk neutrality,
diversiﬁcation is highly relevant under risk aversion because it allows the elimination of
21unsystematic risk. Evaluation herewith is supposed to focus on systematic risk which is
ignored by DP. By assuming an exogeneous RADR, risk averse investors exclude relevant
information from capital budgeting. Finally, these limitations do not suﬃce to reject DP
under risk aversion. An alternative is the application of the investor’s utility function as
shown in chapter 4. Although this procedure requires restrictive assumptions and limits
the analysis to speciﬁc classes of utility functions, investors are enabled to gain important
support for investment decisions since an explicit investment threshold can be derived at
least in the tax-free case.
On the other hand, in CCA all coeﬃcients are either known or observable or can be esti-
mated on the basis of market data [cf. Cox and Ross (1976), pp. 145-146]. CCA’s RADR
has to be derived from capital market equilibrium whenever a risk premium is included
in δ. Only the risk-free market rate is assumed exogeneous. Applying the CAPM in
CCA comprises severe restrictions as described in chapter 4. A critical assumption of
CCA is the spanning property concerning the underlying cash ﬂows that requires com-
plete markets for risky assets. This implies perfect positive correlation of the cash ﬂow
from the investment project and its duplicate. Even if the underlying asset is not quoted
on exchange markets6, the existence of futures markets and the use of securities instead
of real assets to construct a duplicating portfolio reduce this problem to an acceptable
minimum. DP does not rely on such strict requirements concerning capital market prop-
erties. Whenever a speciﬁc risk is not traded one may refer to individual estimations of
risk. Thus, the objective function can be interpreted as a utility function with a constant
discount factor.
Applying real option approaches, either DP or CCA, investment neutrality of a cash ﬂow
tax and a tax equivalent to the taxation of true economic proﬁts, can be proved under
risk neutrality [cf. Niemann (1999)]. Uncertainty and irreversibility do not violate the
neutrality property of such tax systems. In contrast, under risk aversion, proving a tax
system’s neutrality requires further assumptions concerning the project’s life, its cash
ﬂows and depreciation allowances in case of DP and the distribution of the risk premium
among the growth parameter α and the dividend rate δ in CCA.
6In cases of commodities the underlying asset is often quoted.
226 Concluding remarks
The real option approach is an important extension of traditional capital budgeting meth-
ods. It covers uncertainty and managerial ﬂexibility in case of irreversibility and allows
the integration of taxes in calculus. Thus, signiﬁcant improvements of investment deci-
sions become possible. Both approaches, DP and CCA, lead to equivalent results for a
risk neutral investor under the given set of assumptions. Further, it could be shown for
risk averse investors that a comparison of the pre-tax and post-tax decision problems is
limited to a rather restrictive set of assumptions. DP and CCA face diﬀerent limitations
under taxation and risk aversion and lose their equivalence.
Although investment decisions under risk aversion supported by the real option approach
cannot be attributed to a single, all-embracing investment rule, DP and CCA signiﬁcantly
expand the ﬁeld of application of investment models to real investment compared with
traditional models of capital budgeting. In order to ﬁnd more general solutions, future
research has to answer several questions concerning an appropriate RADR and on a
suitable reference system for tax eﬀects on investment behavior.
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